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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980	

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION, 83D ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96391

11 Nov 67

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67.
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

13p.

THRU:

Commanding Officer
54th Artillery Group
APO 96376

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam-Artillery
ATTN: AVFE-FAC
APO 96266

18 OACSFOR

19 OT-RD-674021

S-3110-67

2/3

DDC CONTROL
NO. 81340

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DH
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-MH
APO 96558

FEVA
LOG NO. S-3110-67
COPY NO. 2 OF 3

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
Department of the Army
ATTN: ACSFOR, DA
Washington, D.C. 20310

STATEMENT #2 CLASSIFIED

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Telephoned about

SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. Administration and Personnel:

G3-S-8. 8-180

a. The 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery remains assigned to 54th Artillery Group. 2801697

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HQ USARPAC

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

b. Normal S-1 activities have been conducted during the period
1 August 1967 through 31 October 1967.

c. Personnel strength of the command on 31 October 1967 was:

UNIT	TOE AUTH			MTOE PENDING			ASSIGNED		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
Headquarters Btry	19	1	146	+1	+1	+34	12	1	146
A Battery	3	0	110	+1		+21	4		122
B Battery	3	0	110	+1		+21	4		111
C Battery	3	0	110	+1		+21	4		119
Service Battery	3	3	68			+11	3	2	67
Totals	31	4	544	+4	+1	+108	27	3	565

d. Personnel changes during this quarter include:

(1) GAINS: OFF WO EM

1 2 189

(2) LOSSES: OFF WO EM

15 1 238

(3) A personnel infusion program with the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, 23d Group was completed on 20 October 1967. 24 personnel of assorted enlisted MOSs and grades were infused.

e. Casualties included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Killed in Action	0
Wounded in Action	0
Missing in Action	0
Non-Battle Dead	0
Non-Battle Casualties	0

f. Awards and Decorations presented to members of this command included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Silver Star	0
Legion of Merit	0
Bronze Star (Valor)	0
Bronze Star (Merit)	12
Air Medal (Merit)	6
Air Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster)	2
Soldiers Medal	0
Commendation Medal (Valor)	0
Commendation Medal (Merit)	26
Purple Heart	0

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Note: In addition to these awards, 16 recommendations for awards have been submitted and are pending approval by USMACV.

g. Judicial and non-judicial actions by units included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL COURT</u>
Headquarters Battery	0	0	2	0
A Battery	4	0	1	0
B Battery	5	0	4	0
C Battery	7	0	3	0
Service Battery	1	1	0	0
Totals	17	1	10	0

h. Pertinent medical service statistics include:

Total patient visits (unit personnel)	610
Admitted to hospital	6
Evacuated within the country	0
Evacuated out of country	0
Malaria Cases	0

i. Reportable accidents included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
Headquarters Battery	1	0	1
A Battery	0	0	0
B Battery	2	0	2
C Battery	1	0	1
Service Battery	1	0	0
Totals	5	0	4

2. (C) Intelligence:

a. (U) Sources available to this battalion are as follows:

(1) (C) MACV Binh Tuy Sector and 18th ARVN is contacted on a daily basis by B Battery, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery, Ham Tan.

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MACV-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
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(2) (C) MACV Phuoc Tuy Sector conduct intelligence seminar of all US agencies and commands operating in this province each Monday.

(3) (C) Intelligence briefings are attended daily at LTF. In addition, intelligence seminars conducted Tuesdays and Fridays by LTF Intelligence Officer.

(4) (U) Vols made daily to this HQ.

b. (U) Exchange of information is made on a personal exchange basis.

c. (U) Supplementing the above information this HQ receives from LTF on a daily basis or periodic basis:

- (1) OP Orders
- (2) CO Daily Sitrep
- (3) Frag Intsum
- (4) OP Study
- (5) POW Reports
- (6) Patrol Plans
- (7) TGT List
- (8) Passwords and Point of Origin
- (9) Troop Information

d. (U) Information obtained above is integrated with information received from IIFV and 54th Artillery Group Headquarters

(SME)
3. (C) Training:

a. On the job and individual cross training continues in all units of the battalion.

b. All individual replacements received a 19 hour training program within 7 days of arrival in the unit.

c. A total of three enlisted men have received 8 inch nuclear warhead assembly refresher training during the reported period at HQ, 8th US Army, APO 96301.

d. A total of 2 officers and 5 enlisted men attended a FIDAC computer course conducted by the 54th Artillery Group 5-9 September 1967. The M-16 fire direction computers were issued to the battalion at the conclusion of the course.

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Reports Control Symbol CSFOH-65 (U)

e. A Seminar was held at this headquarters to discuss the methods of the observer finding his location by using artillery fire. Forward Observer from all batteries attended.

4. (C) Operations:

a. Normal operations, consistent with the battalion mission were conducted during the reported period.

b. Operation Ballarat (4 through 16 August) Battery A supported the 1st Australian Task Force in a search and destroy operation in an area northeast of Nui Nghe from vic. YS423656. 943 rounds were fired by this unit during the operation.

c. Operation Atherton (16 through 23 August) Battery A supported the 1st Australian Task Force in a search and destroy mission. 879 rounds were fired by this unit during this operation.

d. Operation Winslie (1 through 21 September) Battery A supported the 1st Australian Task Force in a search and destroy mission north of the 1ATF's position in an area around Route 2 in the vicinity of their resettlement project. 1448 rounds were fired in support of this operation.

e. Operation Quicksilver III (13 through 20 September) Battery C supported the 18th ARVN Division in a search and destroy mission approximately 14,000 meters southeast of Chua Chan mountain, from vic YT631084. A total of 289 rounds were fired by this unit during the operation.

f. Operation Kenmore (30 September through 13 October) Battery A supported the 1st Australian Task Force in a search and destroy mission in the vicinity of Xuyen Moc. 764 rounds were fired in support of this operation.

g. Artillery Raid (7 October) Battery C moved to the 11th Armored Cavalry base camp at Blackhorse for 24 hours. During this period, Battery C along with Battery A and other artillery units saturated an area approximately 16,000 square meters in the vicinity of Thua Tich. The VC D445th Battalion was suspected to be in this area. The saturation attack was accomplished by preplanned H & I fires in coordination with a CS air drop by II Field Force. 298 rounds were fired in support of this operation.

h. Operation Thayer (21 October 1967) Battery A supported Maria Sector HQ in a search and destroy mission in the Phuoc Tuy Province. 78 rounds were fired in support of this operation.

i. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition listed below:

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AVG-2-C

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

UNIT	NUMBER OF MISSILES FIRED		AMMUNITION EXPENDED	
	8"	175mm	8"	175mm
Battery A	2420	2684	4054	4826
Battery B	2099	1841	2877	3282
Battery C	1578	1416	2480	2656
Total	6097	5941	9411	10764

5. (C) Logistics:

a. During the reported period no major problems arose with the exception of resupply to Battery B (located at Ham Tan). Resupply has been effected to Ham Tan by air and water transportation from Vung Tau.

(1) Resupply by Air: Availability of proper aircraft has been irregular. Damage to the asphalt surface, caused by heavily laden C-130 aircraft, has been noted at the airstrip (ZS 989841).

(2) Resupply by Water: LCV and barge resupply of Battery B has not been successful, because the battery encountered difficulties when vehicles are required to ford the inlet separating the off loading point on the sandbar and the mainland. The sandy bottom of the inlet does not support heavy vehicles.

b. Maintenance support is continuing to improve, however some problem areas still exist. The major problems encountered here are locating and obtaining critically needed repair parts. Intensive command attention has been initiated to resolve this problem.

c. (C) Communications: A continuing effort is being made to improve our communications with Battery B which is 40 miles from the Battalion. A plan to implement VHF with MRC 69 or MRC 54 "Shots" is now under way. Additional VHF is required for this unit to have better communications.

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1 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

SECTION 11

PART I, OBSERVATIONS

1. Personnel and Administration

None

2. Intelligence

None

3. Training and Organization

None

4. Operations:

(C) a. Item: Forward Air Controllers.

(1) Discussion: Forward Air Controllers are unaware that the cannon battery FDC uses a mathematical solution in arriving at firing data to bring effective fire on destruction fire missions once the adjustment phase is completed and FFE is requested. Usually the FDC has to interpret the Forward Air Controller's small corrections for range and deflection in the FFE in order to arrive at sensings needed to refine firing data. Generally Forward Air Controllers feel they can, by moving around with normal area fire procedures, destroy a target without using the accepted destruction techniques.

(2) Observation: Forward Air Controllers should be thoroughly acquainted with destruction fire techniques in order to bring effective fire on hard targets without wasting ammunition.

b. Item: Lifting equipment/recovery vehicle equipment.

(1) Discussion: Separate battery operations (e.g. Battery B at Ham Tan and Battery C at Xuan Loc) are isolated and causes ineffective battalion support in the form of a wrecker, fork lift or recovery vehicle need. Current operations are possible only due to vehicles borrowed from nearby or attached units. However, there is no guarantee of availability of these vehicles.

(2) Observation: The separated batteries need organically assigned fork lift (10,000 pound capacity) and one 5 ton wrecker or, preferably, one tracked recovery vehicle in order to insure proper operational capability.

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AVGAZ-C

1 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U).

c. Item: Firing the 175mm gun at quadrants less than 100.

(1) Discussion: When the 175mm gun is fired at low quadrants (under 100) the recoil causes the tube to rise anywhere from 100 to 400 mils from the fired QE, depending on which charge is fired.

(2) Observation: A possible safety hazard exists if the 175mm gun is fired at quadrants less than 100 mils. Excessive strain is placed on the mechanical and hydraulic elevating systems of the weapon. This strain would most likely shorten the life of these parts and possibly cause complete breakdown.

SECTION II

PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Personnel and Administration:

None

2. Intelligence

None

3. Training and Organization:


None

(C) 4. Operations:

a. That Air Force forward air controllers be given detailed instructions in the techniques of firing destruction missions using cannon artillery.

b. That separated batteries (B & C) be issued one fork lift (10,000 pounds capacity) and one track recovery vehicle.

c. That firing of the 175mm gun be prohibited under a 100 QE for reasons of safety and excessive strain on the elevating mechanism.



GLENN W. MILLION
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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AVGA-C (1 Nov 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65, (UIC) WFTJTTA

HEADQUARTERS, 54TH ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96376

29 Nov 67

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AV7D-PAC,
APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH,
APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
ATTN: ACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by 1st Bn, 83d Artillery is considered adequate.

2. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, para 4a, Forward Air Controllers (FAC). The 54th Artillery Group concurs with the need for FAC's to be acquainted with destruction missions by cannon artillery. FAC's receive instruction on Artillery Adjustment in their training school. Upon arriving in country, FAC's are checked out by American Advisors in the procedures of Artillery Adjustment. Additional instruction is given whenever necessary.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, para 4b, Lifting Equipment/Recovery Vehicle Equipment. The 54th Artillery Group concurs with the need of one track recovery vehicle for each separate heavy artillery battery. In October 1967, MTOE's were submitted containing a M578 Recovery Vehicle for each battery.

4. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, para 4c, Firing the 175mm Gun at Quadrants of 100 Mils or Less. According to the Technical Representative from the US Army Weapons Command to the 54th Artillery Group, the excessive jump is caused basically for two reasons: (1) Improper adjustment of the equilibrators and/or (2) The wearing out of the slip clutch and elevating torque locks. Production models are now being manufactured with redesigned stainless steel slip clutches, torque locks, elevating and traversing planetary gear carriers, and elevating drive columns. He further states that the kits are now in country for the old models. The heavy artillery units of the Group have been programmed to have these MWO's put on by the 29th Maintenance Group.

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AVCA-C (1 Nov 67)

1st Ind

29 Nov 67

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65, (UIC) WFTJTTOA

5. (C) Reference Section II, the 54th Artillery Group concurs with all recommendations of the 1st Bn, 83d Artillery, except para 4b. Approval of MTOE change to authorize a M578 Vehicle, Track Recovery per heavy battery will provide sufficient lift capability for separate batteries.

John J. Norris
JOHN J. NORRIS
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVFB-FAC (1 Nov 67) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

DA, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96266 **15 DEC 1967**

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC-DH,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery
(UIC: WA1110) adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned
during the reporting period.

2. (C) Section II, Part II, paragraph 4a. Concur. Any action to
improve the ability of the Forward Air Controller to place effective ar-
tillery fire on the enemy should be encouraged. This headquarters pro-
poses to coordinate with Headquarters, 7th Air Force in determining actions
that can be taken to improve the effectiveness of artillery fire controlled
by the Forward Air Controller.

3. (C) Section II, Part II, paragraph 4b. Nonconcur. A fork lift
has been provided B/1/83rd Artillery for its use. A fork lift for C/1/83rd
Artillery located at Kuan Loc, is not considered necessary. The MTOE sub-
mitted in October 1967 requested an M578, Vehicle, Track, Recovery, be
issued to each heavy battery. This MTOE has been approved by DA and is
scheduled to be implemented by June 1968.

4. (C) Section II, Part II, paragraph 4c. Nonconcur with recommen-
dation to prohibit firing below 100 mil QE. Technical Representatives
from the US Army Weapons Command have stated that if proper adjustments
are applied on the 175mm gun, the excessive jump problem should not occur.
The Army Weapons Command has placed no restriction on firing below 100 mil
QE. Installation of the MWO as explained in paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement,
should correct this problem.

Raymond P. Murphy

RAYMOND P. MURPHY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

01-S-68-103

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AVFBC-RE-H (1 Nov 67) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDFU TO) (U)

DA HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 24 DEC 1967

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.
2. This command has reviewed the attached report and concurs with the comments and recommendations with the following exceptions:

p 4, Classification of para 3 c Training. The nature of the training mentioned in para 3 c of the basic document is not in itself classified. However, the fact that personnel in this command are receiving out-of-country training in this subject warrants a SECRET-NOFORN classification.

Section I, p 1, para 1, Classify CONFIDENTIAL because of strength figures.

Section I, p 6, para 5, Classify CONFIDENTIAL because it discusses specific logistical problems.

Section I, p 6, para 6, Nonconcur. No requirement now exists for additional VHF equipment for B/1/83d Arty. Army Area circuitry will be providing communications for this unit.

Section II, Part I, p 7, para 4, Classify CONFIDENTIAL because specific weaknesses in systems and techniques are revealed.

Section II, Part II, para 4, Classify CONFIDENTIAL for reasons cited in c above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

R. H. VAMBERG
R. H. VAMBERG
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 67) 4th Ind (S)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 22 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery (A11A) as indorsed.


2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning forward air controllers, page 7, paragraph 4a; page 8, paragraph 4a; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2: Concur. In as much as the Forward Air Controller's (FAC) primary mission is the control of tactical air strikes, it must be realized that their capability to adjust artillery fire will be limited. The local artillery commander should acquaint the FAC with artillery adjustment procedures so that he becomes more responsive when called upon to perform this mission.

b. Reference item concerning lifting equipment, page 7, paragraph 4b; page 8, paragraph 4b; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 3. A check of MTOE submitted to DA for approval does not indicate that the M578 vehicles have been included. At the time of submission of MTOE the DA Standardization Team disallowed the vehicle for each heavy battery. It appears that the needs of the battery have been met from locally available resources, which is commendable.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


D. E. TUMAN
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

cy furn:
HQ, II FFORCEV
HQ, 1st Bn, 83d Arty

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G3-S-6 8-180

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